ABSTRACT: A basic question concerning zero-knowledge proof systems is whether their (sequential and/or parallel) composition is zero-knowledge too. This question is not only of natural theoretical interest, but is also of great practical importance as it concerns the use of zero-knowledge proofs as subroutines in cryptographic protocols.
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we investigate the problem of composing zero-knowledge proof systems. Zero-knowledge proof systems, introduced in the seminal paper of Goldwasser, Micali and Rackoff [GMR1] , are efficicmt interactive proofs which have the remarkable property of yielding nothing but the validity of the assertion. Nainely, whatever can be efficiently computed after interacting with a zero-knowledge prover, can be efficiently computed on input a valid assertion. Thus, a zero-knowledge proof is computationally equivalent to an answer of a trusted oracle.
A basic question reg~ng zero-knowledge interactive proofs is whether their composition remains zero-knowledge. This question is not only of theoretical importance, but is also crucial to the utilization of zero-knowledge proof systems as subprotocols inside cryptographic protocols. Of particular interest are sequential and' parallel composition. Candidate "theorems" (whose correctne~s we investigate) are:
Sequential Composition: Let "l. and Il 2 be zero-knowledge proof systems forJanguages L l and L2 respectively. Then, on input Xl oX2' executing rust ilion Xl and afterwards executing Il 2 on x2' constitutes a zero-knowledge interactive proof system for L l oL 2 • Parallel Com~tion: Let III and O 2 be as above. Then, on i~PUt.Xl 0%2' executing concurrently TIl on input Xl and 11 2 on %2' constitutes a zero-knowledge jnteractive proof system for L l oL2. (Concurrent execution means that the.; -th message of the composed protocol consists of the concatenation of the t -th messages in TIl and 02, respectively).
Soon after the first publication of the [GMR1] paper, several researchers noticed that the original formulation of zero-knowledge is probably not closed under sequential composition. Feige and Shamir [F] presented a protocol which seems to be a counterexample to the Sequential Composition "Theorem". In this paper we use the ideas of [F] and new results on pseudorandom distributions, to prove that indeed the original formulation of zero-knowledge is not closed under sequential composition. The reader should be aware that the Sequential Composition Theorem was proven (by Oren [0] ) for a stronger ("non-uniform") formulation of zero-knowledge suggested by several authors (cf. [F, GMR2, 0, 1W] ). This fact is crucial to the utilization of zeroknowledge interactive proofs in cryptographic applications and in particular to the construction of cryptogrllphic protocols for playing any computable game [Y2, GMW2] .
Parallel composition of interactive proofs is widely used as means for decreasing the error probability of proof systems, while maintaining the number of iterations they involv~. Of course one would be interested to apply. these advantages of parallelism also to zero-knowledge protocols. Another possible application of the Parallel Composition "Theorem" is to multi-party protocols in which parties wish to prove (the same and/or different) statements to various parties concurrently. Unfortunately, we show in this~aper a counterexample to the Parallel Composition "Theore~". Namely, we introduce two protocols which are (computationa) zeroknowledge with ,respect to the' strongest known definitions (including the non-unifonn -3-formulation discussed above and the "black-box simulation" formulation discussed bellow) yet their parallel composition is not zero-knowledge (not even in the "weak" sense of the original [GMRll formulation).
The result just discussed rules out the possibility of proving that particular interactive proofs are zero-knowledge by merely arguing that they are the result of parallel composition of various zero-knowledge protocols. But this does not resolve the question whether concrete cases of composed interactive proofs are zerO-knowledge. In particular, since the fll'St presentation of the results in [GMR1] and [GMW1] it was repeatedly asked whether the "parallel versions" of the interactive proOf presented for Quadratic Residuosity, Graph Isomorphism and for any language in NP are zero-knowledge.
In this paper we prove 'that these "parallel" interactive proofs cannot be proven zeroknowledge using black-box simulation, unless (of course) the corresponding languages are in BPP. We say that an interactive' proof is proven zero-knowledge using black-box simulation if there exists a universal simulator which using any (even non-uniform) verifier Y· as a black box, produces a probability distribution which is polynomially indistinguishable from the distribution of conversations of (the same) Y· with the prove.:. Not only that all known zero-knowledge interactive proofs, with respect to non-uniform verifiers, are proven zero-knowledge using a black-box simulation, but it is hard to conceive an alternative way of proving the zerQknowledge property of such an interactive proof.
Our result concerning the p'arallel versions of the interactive proof systems for Quadratic Residuosity [GMR1] , Graph Isomorphism [GMWl] , all languages in NP [GMWll, are special cases of the following theorem:
Theor.em: Let n be a constant-round Arthur-Merlin interactive prooffor a language L. Then n cannot be proven zero-knowledge using black-box simulation, unless L e BPP.
An Atthur-Merlin interactive proof is one in which all the messages sent by the verifier are the outcome of his coin tosses [B] . In other words, the verifier "keeps no secrets from the prover". The Theorem is a good reason to believe that the only feasible way of constructing constant-round zero-knowledge interactive proof is to let the verifier use "secret,coins". In fact, constant-round zero-knowledge proof systems which use "secret coins" are known for Quadratic Non-Residuosity [GMRll, Graph Non-Isomorphism [GMWll, and under the assumed existence of~lawfree pairs of permutations also for any language in NP [GKa] . Thus, "secret coins" help in the zero-knowledge setting. This should be contrasted with the result of Goldwasser and Sipser [GS] which states that Arthur-Merlin interactive.proofs are equivalent to general interactive proofs as far as language recognition is concerned.
The above Theorem is "optimal" in the sense that, the languages considered above have unbounded (i.e. f (n )-round for every unbounded function f.:N -+N) Arthur-Merlin proof systems which are black-box simulation zero-knowledge.
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The above Theorem extends to zero-knowledge pseudoproof systems, considered by [BC2, C, BCC] . An interactive pseudoproof sy.stem for a languages L differs from an interactive proof system for L in that it is only required that probabilistic polynomial-time machines (possibly with auxiliary input) cannot fool the verifier into accepting an input x , L.
The above Theorem extends also to general'3-round interactive proof systems, and seems optimal since there exist 4-round~ero-knowledge interactive proof systems for languages believed to be outside of BPP.
Organization: In Section 2 we present our results concerning the zero-knowledgeness of constant-round Arthur-Merlin protocols. In Section 3 we present the definitions and results concerning pseudorand~m distribution. These results are used in Sections 4 and 5, in which we refute the sequential and parallel composition theorems, respectively. Defmitions of the various notions of zero-knowledge are omitted in this extended abstract. The reader is referred to [GMRl, GMR2, 0] .
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SECRET COINS HELP ZERO-KNOWLEDGE
In this section we present our result concerning zero-knowledge proofs systems in which the interaction is of Arthur-Merlin type. In such systems the (honest) verifier chooses its messages at random. while the only real computation it carries out is the evaluation of a polynomial-time predicate at the end of the interaction. in order to decide the acceptance or rejection of the input to the protocol.
We show that only languages in BPP have constant-round Arthur-Merlin interactive proofs which are black-box simulation zero-knowledge. A zero-knowledge interactive proof <P .V> is called black-box simulation zero-knowledge [0] if it is proved zero-knowledge by presenting a universal simulator. which using any verifier V· as a black-box. succeeds in simulating the <P •V· > interaction. In this defmition of zero-knowledge we allow the verifier V· to be nonuniform.
This definition of zero-knowledge is more restrictive than the original one which allows to have a specific simulator for each verifier V·. As pOinted out in the introduction all known zer.o-knowledge protocols (with non-uniform verifiers) are also black-box simulation zeroknowledge. This fact cannot come as a surprise since it is hard to conceive a way to take advantage of the full.power of the more liberal definition. The main Theorem of this section is Theorem 1: A language L has a constant-round Arthur-Merlin interactive proof which is blackbox simulation zero-knowledge if and only if L e BPP.
We present a proof for a special case of this Theorem. Namely. for the case of a three-round Arthur-Merlin protocol. The general case is proved using careful extensions of the ideas presented here. The three-round case can also be extended for general interactive proof systems. That is. we also have the following. Theorem.
Theorem 2: A language L has a three-round interactive proof which is black-box simulation zero-knowledge if and only if L e BPP.
These results are optimal in the sense that there exist Arthur-Merlin interactive proofs. for languages believed to be outside BPP. with unbounded number of rounds and which are blackbox simulation zero-knowledge. And similarly. there exist four-round interactive proof protocols which are also black-box simulation zero-knowledge.
The case AM(3)
Consider an Arthur-Merlin protocol <P •v> for a language L, consisting of three rounds. We use the following notation. Denote by x the input for the protocol, and by n the length of this input. The first message in the interaction is sent by the prover. We denote it by a. The second round is for V which sends a string J}. The third message is from P and we denote it by y. The predicate compllted by the verifier V in order to accept or reject the input x is denoted by py, and we consider it,. for convenience, as a detenninistic function py(x .a.J}.y). (Our results hold also for'the case in which the predicate Pv also depends on an additional random string r). We will also assume, w.t.o.g., the existence of a polynomial I (n) such that Ia I = I~I = I (n).
Let this three-round Arthur-Merlin protocol <P, v> be black-box simulation zeroknowledge. Denote by M the guaranteed black-box simulator which given access to the blackbox V· can simulate <P ,V· >. The process of simulation consists of several "tries" or calls to the interacting verifier V· ("the black-box"). In each such call the simulator M feeds the arguments for V·. These arguments are the input y (which may be different from the "true" input x), the random coins for V· , denoted r, and a string a representing the message sent by the prover P.
Finally, after completing its tries the simulator outputs a conversation (y ,r ,cx.~,'Y). Notice that the simulator runs polynomial-time and therefore there exists a polynomial t(n) which bounds the number of calls tried ,before outputting a conversati~n.
We shall make some simplifying assumptions on the behaviour of the simulator M, which will not restrict the generality. In particular, we assume that some cases, which may arise with only negligible(l) probability, do not happen at all. This cannot significantly affect the success probability of the simulator. We assume that the conversations output by M have always the fonn (x ,r ,a,~,y), i.e. y =x, and that the string~equals the message output by V· when given the inputs x ,r and a. Note that these conditions always hold for the real conversations generated by the prover P and the verifier V·. Therefore, the simulator must almost always do the same. (Otherwise, a distinguisher which has access to V· • would distinguish between the simulator's output and the original conversations). We also assume that the simulator M explicitly tries, in one of its calls to V· • the parameters x •r and a appearing in the output conversation.
We observe that the behaviour of the simulator M, interacting with a verifier V·, is completely determined by the input x, the random tape R M and the strings output by V· in response to the arguments fed by the simulator during its tries. Based on this observation we define the following process in which the simulator M itself is used as a subroutine.
Fix an input x of length n, a string R M and t =t(n) strings (3(l),~ (2) 
an accepting conversation for the (honest) verifier V. Namely, if Pv(x,a.,~,y)=l, where convM(x.RM,~(I), ... ,~(/»=(x,r,a.,~,y).We say that (x.RM,~(l), ... ,~(t» is i-good if a=a(i) and
The main property of M -good strings is stated in the following Lemma. We get as a corollary the proof of Theorem 1 for the case AM(3).
Lemma 3: Let <P ,v> be a 3-rounds Arthur-Merlin protocol for a language L. Suppose <P ,V> is black-box simulation zero-knowledge, and let M be a black-box simulator as above. Then,
Before proving this key lemma, we use it to prove Theorem 1 for the case of three-round Arthur-Merlin interactive proof.
Proof of Theorem" 1 (for case AM(3»: By Lemma 3 we get that the following is a BPP algorithm for the language L . In other words, we have shown the existence of a string a (=a(iO» for which the set B(x,a) = {~: 3y,pv (x ,a,~,y)= I} is of non-negligible size among all possible strings~. By the soundness property of the AM protocol for L, we get x E L. (For.x f. L, the prover may convince V thar x E L with only negligible probability. Since the honest V selects its responses~at random, then we have that for x f. L and for all a, the set B (x ,a) is of negligible size).
ONLY IF direction:
We show that for x E L most (i.e. all but a negligible portion) of the vectors (x .RM,~(I), ... ,~(/» are M -good. We do it by considering the behaviour of the simulator M when simulating the conversations of the prover P with a particular family of verifiers which we introchice sho~y.
Let x eLand let n denote its length. Consider a family of hash functions H (n) which map I (n)-bit strings to I (n )-bit strings, such that the locations assigned to the strings by a randomly selected hash function are uniformly distributed and t(n)-wise independent. (Recall that l(n) is the length of messages a and p in the Arthur-Merlin protocol <.P., v> for L, while t(n) is the bound on the number of M 's tries)..For properties and implementation of such functions see [J] .
We denote this set of hash functions by H (n).
For each hash function h e H(n) we associate a verifier v;, which responds to the prover's message a with the string p=h (a) . Consider the simulation of <.P , V;> conversations by the simulator M. Fixing a random tape R M for M and a function h e H (n), the whole simulation is de,termined. In particular, this defines a sequence of a's tried by the simulator, and the corresponding responses p of V;. Denote by a(l),a (2) Proof of Claim 3.1: By the completeness property of the protocol <.P ,V>, most of the conversations between P and V on input x e L are accepting. That is, for most coin sequences R p of the prover P , and most choices p of V, the resultant conversation (x ,a(x,Rp) , p, y(x,Rp ,P» is accepting.
Consider now the interaction between the prover P an.d the verifiers V; on x e L. By the uniformity property of the family H(n) we get that for every a, all P's are equi-probable as the result of h(a). This, together with the above remark on the conversations between P and V, implies that for most strings Rp , and for most hash functions h, the interaction of P with V; leads to an accepting conversation.
Since the simulator M succeeds in simulating <.P ,V;> conversations for all functions h e H(n), we get that for most h 's the simulator M outputs with very high probability an accepting conver- 
ON EVASIVE AND PSEUDORANDOM SETS
In the demonstration of counterexamples for the "composition theorems" we make use of pseudorandom distributions which .have some interesting "evasiveness" properties. These properties and the corresponding proofs are given in other Technical Report [OK] of these authors and cited here without proof.
Roughly speaking, a distribution on a set of strings of length k is pseudorandom if this distribution cannot be efficiently distinguished (Le. by polynomial means) from the uniform distribution on the set of all strings of length k. In order~o formalize this notion one has to define it in asymptotical terms and refer to collections of distributions (called pseudorandom ensembles), rather than single distributions. Nevertheless, in this paper we shall speak about particular sets which are "pseudorandom". Before giving the formal definition of this concept we introduce the following notation which we use through the coming sections.
Notation: II; will denote the set {O,l}l;. The expression S ER S means "the element s is chosen with uniform probability from the set S ".
Definition: A set S~/" is called (t(k) ,E,(k»-pseudorandom if for any (probabilistic) circuit C of size t(k) with k inputs and a single output

Ipc(S)-Pc(l k ) I~E,(k)
where Pc(S) (resp. PC(lI;») denotes the probability that C outputs I when given elements of S (resp.l k ), chosen with uniform probability.
Note that a collection of uniform distributions on a sequence of sets S 1 ,S2'''', where each Sk is a (t(k) •£(k) )-pseudorandom set, constitutes a pseudorandom ensemble, provided that both functions t(n) and E,-l(n) grow faster than any polynomial. We shall refer to such a sequence as a pseudorandom one.
We now introduce the concept of "evasive sets". Informally. evasiveness means that it is hard, for efficient algorithms, to find strings which belong to these sets. Definition: Let S 1'S2 .... be a sequence of (non-empty) sets such that for every n, Sfll:: {O,I}Q(fI), for a fixed polynomial Q. Such a sequence is called polynomially-evasive (denoted P -evasive) if for any polynomial-time' probabilistic algorithm A. any constant c, sufficiently large n. and any
where the probability is taken over the random coins of algorithm A .
In our technical report we prove the existence of P-evasive sequences which are also pseudorandom. -11 -For disproving the parallel composition theorem we shall need a stronger notion of evasiveness. Namely, one which resists also non-uniform algorithms. We postpone the details till section 5.
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SEQUENTIAL COMPOSITION OF ZERO-KNOWLEDGE PROTOCOLS
A natural requirement from the notion of zero-knowledge proofs is that the information obtained by the verifier during the execution of a zero-knowledge protocol will not enable him to extract any additional knowledge from subsequent executions of the same protocol. That is. it would be desirable that the sequential composition of zero-knowledge protocols would yield a protocol which is itself zero-knowledge. Such a property is crucial for applications of zeroknowledge protocols in cryptography (for details and further motivation see [0] ).
We prove that the original defInition of (computational) zero-knowledge introduced by
Goldwasser. Micali and Rackoff in [GMR1] is not closed under sequential composition. (Several authors have previously observed that this defInition probably does not guarantee its robustness under sequential composition. and hence have introduced more robust formulations of zero-knowledge [F. GMR2. O. TWJ). As far as we know. no proof has been given for the claim that 'computational zero-knowledge (with uniform verifIers) fails sequential composition. Feige [F] proposed a protocol that appear~to be zero-knowledge when executed once but reveals signifIcant information during a second execution. Using the underlying idea of this protocol and Theorem 4 above. we prove the following Theorem?: Computational Zero-Knowledge ([GMR1] formulation) is not closed under sequential composition.
Proof: Let S 1 •S2 .... be a P-evasive sequence as described in Theorem 4. Also. let K be a hard Boolean function. in the sense that the language Lx = {x:K(x)=I} is not in BPP.
yve defIne the following interactive-proof protocol <.P .V> for the language L = {O.l}·. (Obviously. this language has a trivial zero-knowledge proof in which the verifier accepts every input. without carrying out any interaction. We intentionally modify this .protocol in order to demonstrate a zero-knowledge protocol which fails sequential composition).
Let x be the common input for P and V. and let n denote the length of x. The verifIer V begins by sending to the prover a random string S of length 4n. The prover P checks whether S E SrI (the n -th set in the P-evasive sequence defIned above). If this is the case then P sends to V the value of K(x). Otherwise (s ¢. SII)' P sends to V a string So randomly selected from SIlO In any case the verifIer accepts the input x (as belonging to L ).
We stress that the same P-evasive sequence is used in all the executions of the protocol. Thus. the set S" does not depend on the specifIc input to the protocol. but only on its length. Therefore. the string So. obtained by the verifIer in the frrst execution of the protocol. enables him to deviate from the protocol during a second execution in order to obtain the value of K(x). for any x of length n. Indeed. instead of rando~y choosing the string s at the beginning of the second exec~tion. a "cheating" verifIer sends the string so. Observe that this cheating verifIer obtain information that cannot be computed by itself. There is no way to simulate in probabilistic polynomial-time the interaction in which the prover sends the value of K (x). Otherwise the language L K is in BPP.
Thus, it is clear that the protocol is not zero-knowledge when composed twice. On the other hand, the protocol is zero-knowledge (when executed 'the fIrSt time). To show that, we present for any verifier V·, a polynomial-time simulator M v • that can simulate the conversations between V· and the prover P. There is only one message sent by the prover during the protocol. It sends the value of K (x), in case that the string S sent by the verifier belongs to the set S", and a randomly selected element of S", otherwise. By the eVaSivity condition of the set S", there is only a negligible probability that the first case hold,S. Indeed, no probabilistic polynomial-time machine (in our case, the verifier) can find such a string S e' S", except with insignificant probability (no matter the input x to the protocol is). Thus, the simulator can succeed by always simulating the second possibility, i.e. the sending of a random element So from SIlO This step is simulated by randomly choosing So from 1 411 rather than from SIlO The indistinguishability of this choice from the original one follows from the fact that each SIt is a pseudorandom subset of 1 411 , and that So is chosen at random from SIlO • Remark: For any language L having a zero-knowledge interactive proof, one can present a zero-knowledge protocol which fails sequential composition. Simply, modify the original protocol for L as done in the above proof. (There, we have arbitrarily chosen L = {O, I}· ). Unfortunately, we cannot expect the GMR definition to satisfy this condition. It is easy to see that a zero-knowledge protocol which is not closed under sequential composition can be transformed into another zero-knowledge protocol which fails parallel composition. Thus, our result of the previous section implies that GMR zero-knowledge is not closed under parallel execution.
In light of the result that auxiliary-input zero-knowle4ge is robust under sequential composition [0] , it is an interesting open question'whether this formulation of zero-knowledge is also robust under parallel composition. The main result of this section is that this is not the case. We prove the existence of protocols which are zero-knowledge even against non-uniform verifiers, e.g. auxiliary-input zero-knowledge, but which do not remain zero-knowledge when executed twice in parallel. As for the case of sequential composition o~results concern only computational zero-knowledge.
The ideas used for the design of a protocol which fails parallel composition are similar to those used for the sequential case. There, we" have used the pseudorandomness and evasiveness of some sets to construct the intended protocol. We use this method also here. The main difficulty to extend these properties for the present case, is that now we need an evasive collection which resists even non-uniform verifiers. Clearly, a P-evasive sequence will not satisfy this condition, as for any set of strings will exist non-uniform verifiers which will output elements in this set (e.g. by getting such a string as auxiliary-input). Thus, we need a stronger definition of evasiveness involving a collection of sets for each length, rather than a single set as in the uniform case.
Definition: Let QO be a polynomial, and for n =1,2,00, let S(II) be a collection of 2" sets {SE") , ... , si:)}, where each Spa)!* {O,I}Q(II). The sequence S(l) ,S(2) ,,,. is called non-uniform polynomially evasive (denoted PIpoly-evasive) if for any c > 0, fot sufficiently large n and any circuit C of size n C (with n inputs and Q(n) outputs)
where the probability is taken over the random coins of C and i e (I, ... ,men)}, both with uniform probability.
That is, a sequence S(l) ,S(2) ' 00. is P/poly-evasive if any circuit of size polynomial in n, which gets a randomly selected index of one of the sets in S(II), cannot succeed to output an element in that set, except for a negligible probability.
Following is the main result concerning P/poly-evasive collections which we shall use in the proof of Theorem 7 bello",. Proof: We present a pair of protocols <P I •VI> and <P2' V 2> which are zero-knowledge when executed independently, but whose parallel composition is provable not zero-knowledge.
We use some dummy steps in the protocols in order to achieve synchronization between them. Of course one can modify the protocol substituting these extra steps by significant ones. The version we give here prefers simplicity rather than "elegance". Both protocols consist of five steps. (See Figure 1) 
The first protocol is denoted <PI' VI>' Let x be the input to the protocol and let n denote its length. The protocol uses (for all its executions) a P/poly-evasive sequence S(I) ,S(2) ,... with the properties describe.d in Theorem 6. It also involves a hard Boolean function K as in the proof of Theorem 5. The prover P I begins by sending to V I an index i E R (1 , ... , 2 11 }. After two dummy steps the verifier V~sends to Pia string S E R /4/1' The prover P I checks whether S E S/"). If this is the case then it sends to VI the value of K(x) . This concludes the protocol.
The second protocol <P 2 ,V 2 > uses the same PIpoly-evasive sequence S(1) ,So.) ,... as protocol <P l'VI> does. The first step of the protocol is a dummy one. In the second step the verifier V 2 sends to P 2 an index j ER (1, ... ,2/1). The prover P 2 responds with a string r ER st>. After two more dummy steps the protocol stops.
We show that the above protocols are indeed zero-knowledge (even for non-uniform verifiers). For the frrst protocol, there are two steps of the prover to be simulated. In the frrst step PI sends an index i E R (1, ... , 2/1 }. The simulator does the same. In the second step, the prover sends the value of K.{x) only if the verifier succeeds to present him a string which belongs to the set Si(n). By the evasivity condition of the sequence S(I) .S(2) ...., this will happen with negligible probability and therefore the simulator can always simulate this step as for the case where the verifier sends a string s fJ S;'"). ObselVe that the circuits in the defmition of P/poly-evasive sequences only get as input the index of the set to be hit. Nevertheless. in our case the circuits also get an additional input x. This cannot help them fmding an element in SIn). Otherwise. circuits which have such a string incorporated will contradict the evasiveness condition.
In the second protocol. <P 2 .V2>' the only significant step of the prover P 2 is when it sends an element rER sin) in response to the index j sent by the verifier. In this case the simulator will send a string r' e R 1 4n • Using the pseudorandomness property of the set s}lt) we get that the simulator's choice is polynomially indistinguishable from the prover's one.
Finally we show that the parallel composition of the above protocols into a single protocol <P .V> is not zero-knowledge. Let V· be a "cheating" verifier which behaves as follows. Instead of sending a randomly selected index j (corresponding to the second step of the subprotocol <P2.V 2>) it sends the index i received from P as part of PI'S first step. Thus. j = i , and the prover P will respond with a string r e slit). In the next step this string r will be sent by V to P as the "random" string s that VI should send to PI' The prover P will verify that r e Si(lt) and then will send the information K(x) . Because of the way we have chosen the function K this step cannot be simulated by a probabilistic polynomial-time machine. Therefore. the composed protocol <P ,V> is not zero-knowledge.
• Remark: The two protocols <PI,V I > and <P 2 .V 2 > can be merged into a single zero-knowledge protocol which is not robust under parallel composition. Let the prover in the merged protocol to choose at random an index i e {l.2}. and then execute the protocol <Pj,V i >. This protocol. when executed twice in parallel, has probability one-half to become a parallel execution of <P I.V I> and <P 2 ,V2>' Therefore. it is not zero-knowledge.
